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Abstract At present there is a debate on the number of
body representations in the brain. The most commonly
used dichotomy is based on the body image, thought to
underlie perception and proven to be susceptible to bodily
illusions, versus the body schema, hypothesized to guide
actions and so far proven to be robust against bodily illu-
sions. In this rubber hand illusion study we investigated the
susceptibility of the body schema by manipulating the
amount of stimulation on the rubber hand and the partici-
pant’s hand, adjusting the postural conﬁguration of the
hand, and investigating a grasping rather than a pointing
response. Observed results showed for the ﬁrst time altered
grasping responses as a consequence of the grip aperture of
the rubber hand. This illusion-sensitive motor response
challenges one of the foundations on which the dichotomy
is based, and addresses the importance of illusion induction
versus type of response when investigating body
representations.
Keywords Rubber hand illusion  Body schema 
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Introduction
Head and Holmes (1911–1912) are among the ﬁrst who
identiﬁed the need for multiple body representations in the
brain. The representations they identiﬁed were based on a
large heterogeneous group of neurological patients that
showed that different bodily sensations can be lost inde-
pendently of each other (Head and Holmes 1911–1912).
However, to date there is no agreement on the number and
characteristics of mental body representations (Berlucchi
and Aglioti 1997; Felician et al. 2003; Gallagher 1986;
Gallagher 2005; Gallagher and Cole 1995; Paillard 1999;
Schwoebel and Coslett 2005; Sirigu et al. 1991). This is
partly because the identiﬁcation of different body repre-
sentations have been dissociated on multiple levels,
including conscious versus unconscious, dynamic versus
static, and top–down versus bottom–up. Although numer-
ous body representations have been identiﬁed, the most
parsimonious and commonly used dissociation is between
two general representations: the body image, a cognitive
representation which integrates stored knowledge and
experiences and is thought to underlie perceptual judg-
ments; and the body schema, thought to be a more holistic
representation mainly based on proprioceptive input and
used to govern body movements (e.g., Gallagher 1986;
Paillard 1991, 1999).
In line with this dualism, research into body represen-
tations in the healthy brain has also resulted in a distinction
between (at least) two dissociable body representations
(Kammers et al. 2006). This dissociation has been estab-
lished by task dependency of bodily illusions in healthy
individuals. More speciﬁcally, perceptual and motor tasks
have been used to localize body parts during sensory
conﬂict induced by the illusion. When a bodily illusion
resulted in signiﬁcantly different localizations in each task,
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underlying body representations (Kammers et al. 2006,
2009a, b).
Several key suppositions underlie this principal line of
reasoning. First, the multisensory conﬂict induced by the
bodily illusion must be solved differently for separate body
representations. In other words, although the same (con-
ﬂicting) sensory information is provided to the brain, the
way to calibrate the localization of the illuded body part
must depend on the task. Second, this different calibrating
or weighting of sensory information must result in signif-
icant different localizations (otherwise dissociating two
modes of response becomes difﬁcult). Third, the two
administered tasks must actually tap on different body
representations.
There is supporting evidence for all three raised pre-
mises. First, we know from patient studies that localization
without perception can be doubly dissociated from per-
ception without localization (Dijkerman and de Haan 2007;
Head and Holmes 1911–1912; Paillard 1991, 1999;
Rossetti et al. 2001). Second, it is known that multisensory
information can be weighted differently depending on the
task. For example, research on multimodal integration has
shown that dominance of either vision or proprioception in
localization depends on the task demands (Scheidt et al.
2005; van Beers et al. 1998, 1999, 2002). Third, there is a
vast amount of literature describing a (theoretical) disso-
ciation between a general body representation underlying
action (body schema) versus one underlying perceptual
judgments (body image). This is true even in some of the
theories in which three or four representations have been
identiﬁed, since many of these ‘‘additional’’ representations
are thought to be separations of either the body image or
the body schema (e.g., Coslett and Lie 2004; Schwoebel
and Coslett 2005; Sirigu et al. 1991). Furthermore, the
dissociation between motor and perceptual tasks is in line
with the dissociation found for the ventral ‘‘what/percep-
tual’’ versus dorsal ‘‘how/motor’’ stream identiﬁed for the
visual system (Goodale and Milner 1992).
Similarly, bodily illusion task dependency between
motor responses and perceptual judgments has now been
established in healthy individuals as well (Kammers et al.
2006, 2009a, b). However, so far this dissociation has
largely been characterized by highly susceptible perceptual
judgments (body image), versus highly robust motor
responses (body schema). Our interpretation of this dif-
ference in susceptibility has been that the body schema is
mainly based on bottom–up proprioceptive information
and takes into account the body’s information as a whole
(Kammers et al. 2006). This more holistic representation is
therefore less disturbed by a (local) bodily induced sensory
conﬂict. For example, in a vibrotactile kinaesthetic illusion
only the vibrated tendon is signaling the brain that it is
stretching. The body schema is in this case hypothesized to
still incorporate other senses and afferent information,
which leads to a net result that is hardly, or even not at all,
affected by the bodily illusion-induced conﬂict. The body
image, on the other hand, is hypothesized to take into
account previous (sensory) experiences and stored body
knowledge. In this case the body image is hypothesized to
take the top–down information into account, ‘‘knowing
from experience’’ that stretching of a muscle is accompa-
nied by movement of the attached limb, which results in a
net relocation of the perceived location of the illuded arm
for perceptual responses.
We have not been able to show any illusion-dependent
kinematic changes in pointing movements investigated
with a bodily illusion that induces relocation of one’s own
hand together with changes in higher-order bodily experi-
ences; the rubber hand illusion (RHI). In this illusion a
multisensory conﬂict is induced by synchronous stroking of
a visible rubber hand placed at a natural anatomical posi-
tion and a person’s unseen own hand (Botvinick and Cohen
1998). The RHI has already been demonstrated in numer-
ous studies (see for example, Costantini and Haggard 2007;
Durgin et al. 2007; Ehrsson et al. 2004; Farne et al. 2000;
Lloyd 2007; Longo et al. 2008; Pavani et al. 2000; Tsakiris
and Haggard 2005), but consistent effects on action
responses have remained elusive. One possible explanation
was thought to be that the body schema might only be
affected when the manner of conﬂict induction corresponds
to the way the body schema represents the body, i.e., for
action. However, implementing active movement during
induction of the RHI using a modiﬁed video paradigm,
(i.e., manipulating feeling of agency) still did not result in
signiﬁcant illusion effects on the pointing task (Kammers
et al. 2009c).
As such, no double dissociation has been found in the
healthy brain between body representations. However,
there are reports of illusion-sensitive motor responses that
are affected by bodily induced multimodal conﬂicts. With
use of the Mirror illusion, Holmes and colleagues have
shown altered pointing responses after either active or
passive exposure to either the reﬂection of the participant’s
contralateral own hand or the reﬂection of a rubber hand
(Holmes et al. 2004, 2006; Holmes and Spence 2005).
Implications of this will be outlined in the discussion.
Nevertheless, the difference in susceptibility between the
body image (perceptual judgment) and the body schema
(motor response) to certain bodily illusions remains
intriguing and the reasoning that the body schema might be
more affected when the illusions operate on incoming
sensory information that is on the level the body schema
functions might still be valid.
In the present experiment we therefore introduced three
new manipulations using the RHI. First we apply a more
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123global stimulation of the participant’s own hand and the
rubber hand (in general the RHI is generated by stimulation
of only one ﬁnger). Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) showed
that the RHI merely occurred locally: only the felt position
of the stimulated ﬁnger drifted toward the rubber hand,
although a non-stimulated ﬁnger could be affected when
bordered by two stimulated ﬁngers. In other words, the
body image can be fragmented and local, whereas the body
schema is hypothesized to be more holistic in nature.
However, it has not been investigated whether additional
tactile stimulation on the hand induces a differential effect
on a motor response. As such, we try to target the motoric
body representation by stimulating the thumb as well as the
index ﬁnger. Second, we introduced a new orientation of
the rubber hand, whereby the hand is positioned on its side
in a ‘grasping orientation’. Instead of inducing a conﬂict
between the locations of the two hands in the horizontal
plane, we induced a conﬂict between the grip aperture
(distance between index ﬁnger and thumb) of the rubber
hand and the participant’s own hand in the vertical plane.
Finally, we measure not a pointing motor task but instead
investigated the kinematics of a grasping response to an
external object. Finally, we implemented a perceptual
scaling response on half of the trials, to investigate the
conscious perceived grip aperture of the illuded hand (body
image). This was done on only half of the trials because
otherwise an effect on the motor task might be mediated by
either a delay between induction and grasping, and/or by
the preceding perceptual response.
Methods
Participants
Eleven right-handed healthy female university students
participated in the experiment (mean age 24.1 years, SD
4.0). All participants gave written informed consent and
right-handedness was assessed by the Dutch handedness
questionnaire (Van Strien 1992). Participants with a score
of 7 or more were included in this study, indicating a strong
preference for right-handedness in daily activities. All
participants were naive to the rationale of the experiment.
Experimental setup
Participants stood in front of a high table, with their right
forearm resting in the bottom compartment of a wooden
framework. A right rubber hand, specially modiﬁed such
that its grip aperture (the distance between index ﬁnger and
thumb) could be adjusted, was placed in the top compart-
ment, directly above the participant’s own hand (see
Fig. 1).
The participant’s right forearm was occluded from
vision by the framework throughout the experiment.
Additionally, participants wore a black smock to occlude
their upper arms as well as their left hand and forearm. The
rubber hand was visible in the top compartment through a
Plexiglas cover, and presented on its side, with the little
ﬁnger resting on the table (ulna down, with the radial side
pointing upwards). A grasping target, consisting of a cyl-
inder of either 3 or 5 cm diameter, was visible 9 cm behind
the framework. Participants stood on an adjustable plat-
form such that they could comfortably rest their forearms
with their elbows forming approximately 90 angles. The
left hand was placed on the table outside the framework,
5 cm higher than the right hand, to eliminate any height
reference participants might experience from leaning on
the same plane. Participants were asked to relax and to
refrain from moving their limbs during trials.
Design
Participants made grasping movements toward a target
cylinder while the motion of their thumb and index ﬁnger
were recorded. In order to investigate conﬂict between the
spatial conﬁguration of the rubber hand and the conﬁgu-
ration of the participant’s own hand, we independently
manipulated the starting grip aperture of both the rubber
hand and the participant’s hand: either small (4 cm) or
A C
B
D
Fig. 1 Experimental setup as seen from the experimenter’s view. The
rubber hand (a) is presented in a framework occluding the partici-
pant’s own hand (b). The participant’s left hand (c) was used on some
trials to make a perceptual matching response, mimicking the
perceived grip aperture of the right hand. Note that only the rubber
hand was visible to the participant, through a layer of Plexiglas
(dashed arrow). A cylinder which was also visible to the participant
formed the reaching target (d), although actual grasping movements
were made without visual feedback
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123large (6 cm). Participants were therefore tested in two
different congruent conditions as well as two conﬂict
conditions. Additionally, the diameter of the cylinder that
formed the grasping target could be either small (3 cm) or
large (5 cm). Finally, on half the trials the grasping
movement was preceded by a perceptual task, in which
participants used their (occluded) left hand to indicate the
perceived grip aperture of their stimulated right hand
before making the grasping movement. Participants carried
out 2 trials in each of the 16 total combinations of condi-
tions. Trial order was counterbalanced in blocks across
participants. The experiment was conducted in two sepa-
rate sessions of about 2 h each.
Procedure
Rubber hand illusion induction
At the start of each trial, the RHI was induced by syn-
chronous stroking of the thumb and index ﬁnger simulta-
neously of both the rubber hand and the participant’s hand
using two sets of identical paintbrushes. Stimulation was
delivered manually for 60 s by the experimenter. During
this period, participants had their eyes open and were
instructed to watch the rubber hand. The hand with which
the experimenter stimulated the rubber hand was visible to
the participant; the experimenter’s other hand was not.
Participants were instructed to pay attention to the grip
aperture of the rubber hand as well as to the grasping
target. After induction of the illusion, participants were
instructed to close their eyes, and responses were recorded.
Note that stimulation was synchronous in all conditions,
such that the RHI was induced in all trials.
Perceptual response
On half of the trials, participants were asked to report the
perceived grip aperture of their right stimulated hand just
before the grasping movement was made (i.e., directly after
induction of the RHI). They were instructed to do so by
mimicking the perceived grip aperture of their right hand
using their non-stimulated, occluded left hand.
Grasping response
In each trial, participants made a grasping movement to the
vertical cylinder which had been visible in the induction
phase of the trial. Participants were instructed to grasp the
cylinder at its midpoint, and to do so in a single, ﬂuid
motion. Once the movement was completed, the participant
withdrew their hand and the experimenter realigned the
participants hand with the rubber hand to prepare for the
next trial. Note that participants had their eyes closed
during the grasping movement. Visual feedback was
therefore unavailable and the movement was memory-
guided, with a delay of *2 s (no preceding perceptual
judgments) or *10 s (with preceding perceptual judg-
ments) between induction of the illusions and the grasping
response.
Kinematic recordings
All grasping movements were recorded with a miniBIRD
(Ascension Technology) kinematic recording device sam-
pling the positions of the participant’s thumb and index
ﬁnger at 86 Hz. Trials were repeated if the grasping motion
was not completed within 3 s, or if the participants moved
their hand after grasping the bar. This was done without
informing the participant. Kinematic data were ﬁltered
using a second-order Butterworth ﬁlter. On each trial, the
grasping movement was deﬁned as the time during which
the velocity of either marker exceeded 5 mm/s. Dependent
variables of interest were maximum grip aperture (MGA),
peak velocity (PV), time to maximum grip aperture
(TTMGA), and time to peak velocity as a proportion of
movement time (TTPV).
Results
Grasping response
Maximum grip aperture, time to maximum grip aperture,
peak velocity, and time to peak velocity were entered into
2 9 2 9 2 9 2 repeated measures analyses of variance
with the following factors: OWN HAND (small/large)
RUBBER HAND (small/large), TARGET SIZE (small/
large), and PRECEDING PERCEPTUAL RESPONSE
(yes/no). Eleven participants each contributed 16 data
points, each of which consisted of the mean of two trials.
Because no signiﬁcant main or interaction effects were
observed on any of the dependent variables for PRE-
CEDING PERCEPTUAL RESPONSE, trials with and
without a preceding perceptual response have been col-
lapsed in all ﬁgures.
Maximum grip aperture
A signiﬁcant main effect of TARGET SIZE on MGA was
observed (F = 27.89, df = 1, p\0.001) (Fig. 2): partici-
pants opened their hands further when reaching for a large
target than when reaching for a small target (mean differ-
ence ± SD, 4.1 ± 2.6 mm). Furthermore, there was a
signiﬁcant main effect of OWN HAND: participants’ MGA
was larger when the starting grip aperture of their own
hand was large compared to when it was small (F = 59.8,
206 Exp Brain Res (2010) 202:203–212
123df = 1, p\0.001; mean difference ± SD, 4.6 ±
2.0 mm). Critically, a main effect of RUBBER HAND was
observed: when participants viewed a rubber hand with a
small grip aperture, MGA was smaller than when the
rubber hand had a large grip aperture (F = 6.92, df = 1,
p = 0.025; mean difference ± SD, 7.1 ± 9.0 mm). There
was no effect of whether participants made a PRECEDING
PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT (F = 0.17, df = 1,
p = 0.689) and none of the interactions were signiﬁcant
(all p[0.246). These results are summarized in Fig. 2,
clearly showing that the grip aperture of the rubber hand
affects the MGA of the grasping movement.
Peak velocity
No main effects were observed for PV (all p[0.189).
However, the two-way interaction between OWN HAND
and RUBBER HAND was signiﬁcant (F = 9.45, df = 1,
p = 0.012) (Fig. 3). This was a congruency effect: when
the grip aperture of the participants’ own hand mismatched
with the rubber hand, PV dropped signiﬁcantly compared
to when the grip apertures of the participant’s hand and the
rubber hand matched. In other words, when there was RHI-
induced conﬂict, participants’ grasping movements were
slower than when there was no such conﬂict (mean dif-
ference ± SD, 44.4 ± 47.9 mm/s). Additionally, there was
a signiﬁcant interaction between RUBBER HAND and
TARGET SIZE (F = 6.57, df = 1, p = 0.028). This too
was a congruency effect: grasping movements were faster
when the rubber hand grip aperture and the grasping target
were either both small or both large, and slower when one
was large and the other small. None of the other interac-
tions were signiﬁcant (all p[0.277).
Time to maximum grip aperture and time to peak velocity
No signiﬁcant effects were found for TTMGA, although
the three-way interaction of OWN HAND, RUBBER
HAND, AND TARGET SIZE approached signiﬁcance
(F = 4.88, df = 1, p = 0.052). No other main or interac-
tion effects were near signiﬁcance (all p[0.159)
(Fig. 4a). No signiﬁcant main or interaction effects were
observed for TTPV (all p[0.144) (Fig. 4b). Overall, there
was minimal variance in both TTMGA and TTPV; in both
cases, mean values across conditions fell within a range of
just 5 ms. Finally, visual inspection of the grasping tra-
jectory traces did not reveal any systematic differences
between conditions, besides those reﬂected in the above-
mentioned effects on MGA and PV.
Perceptual response
Perceptual matching responses were entered into a 2 9 2
analysis of variance with the grip aperture of the partici-
pant’s own right hand (small or large) and the grip aperture
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Fig. 2 Maximum grip aperture (MGA) as a function of target size, for
different starting grip apertures of the participant’s own hand (OH)
and rubber hand (RH). Error bars depict standard errors of the mean.
The vertical axis indicates the maximum distance between the motion
sensors attached to participants’ thumb and ﬁnger, and is therefore a
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conditions. Three main effects are evident: MGA increases with OH
grip aperture, with RH grip aperture, and with target size
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Fig. 3 Peak velocity (PV) as a function of target size, for different
starting grip apertures of the participant’s own hand (OH) and rubber
hand (RH). Error bars depict standard errors of the mean. The
vertical axis indicates the maximum velocity of the grasping
movement. Open markers denote congruent conditions, and closed
markers denote conﬂict conditions. An interaction effect is evident:
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123of the rubber hand (small or large) as factors. An expected
main effect of OWN HAND was observed (F = 178.13,
df = 1, p\0.001): participants indicated a larger aperture
with their left hand when the aperture of their right hand
was large than when it was small (mean difference ± SD,
24.3 ± 6.0 mm). Importantly, however, we observed a
main effect of RUBBER HAND (F = 19.21, df = 1,
p = 0.001): participants indicated a larger grip aperture
when viewing a rubber hand with a large grip aperture,
than when viewing a rubber hand with a small grip aperture
(mean difference ± SD, 8.9 ± 6.7 mm). The effect of the
rubber hand was greater when the participant’s own grip
aperture was large than when it was small (mean differ-
ence ± SD, 13.4 ± 9.7 and 4.3 ± 8.0 mm, respectively),
as indicated by a signiﬁcant interaction effect (F = 6.63,
df = 1, p = 0.028). In sum, perceptual responses were
affected in a way that followed the expected direction of
the RHI.
Perception–action interactions
On half the experimental trials, participants reported the
perceived grip aperture of their stimulated right hand (by
matching it with their left hand) before making the grasp-
ing movement. We observed no effect of this perceptual
judgment on any of the four kinematic parameters of the
subsequent movement (MGA, TTMGA, PV, and TTPV; all
main effects p[0.189, all interactions p[0.144). As
such, execution of the grasping movement appears unaf-
fected by whether participants were required to make a
preceding perceptual judgment.
Discussion
There are commonly considered to be at least two disso-
ciable body representations in the brain: the body image
and the body schema. In the present RHI study we inves-
tigated the susceptibility of the body schema, which is
thought to underlie actions and has been found to be largely
robust against bodily illusions. In order to do so, we (1)
manipulated the amount of stimulation on the rubber hand
and the participant’s own hand, (2) adjusted the spatial
conﬁguration of the rubber hand so it was in a ‘grasping
conﬁguration’, and (3) investigated a grasping rather than a
pointing motor response.
As well as showing a RHI-dependent effect on percep-
tual scaling judgments presumably subserved by the body
image, the present study for the ﬁrst time demonstrates a
RHI effect on kinematic parameters of a grasping move-
ment. Speciﬁcally, we observed effects on both MGA and
PV during the grasping movement. Participants opened
their hand during the grasping motion according to the grip
aperture of the rubber hand. The effect of the rubber hand’s
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123grip aperture was therefore comparable to the effect of the
starting grip aperture of participant’s own grasping hand.
Interestingly, the direction of the effect on MGA was
opposite to the direction in which motor responses hypo-
thetically would have been affected in other bodily illu-
sions. If we would take the traditional RHI as an example,
in a pointing task the effect of the illusory displacement
would be expected to manifest as end-point errors away
from the rubber hand (in a similar way to end-point errors
found in many manipulations of the mirror illusion or after
prism adaptation (see for example Holmes et al. 2004;
Kitazawa et al. 1997). The rationale behind this is that the
perceived starting position of the participant’s hand shifts
toward the location of the visible rubber hand. As such, a
motor program to reach a target is planned from this illuded
start position. When that motor program is then executed
from the actual position of the participant’s hand, this
would result in a pointing error away from the rubber hand
(Fig. 5, top left panel). Following this line of reasoning, we
would expect the MGA on grasping responses to be larger
when the participant viewed a rubber hand with a small
grip aperture, since the motor program would then need to
incorporate additional ‘opening’ of the perceived starting
grip aperture (Fig. 5, bottom left panel). Instead, we
observed the opposite: MGA during the grasping move-
ment was larger when participants viewed a rubber hand
with a large grip aperture (Fig. 5, bottom right panel).
In order to make correct grasping or pointing/reaching
movements, the brain needs to know the body’s correct
starting position (Rossetti et al. 1995). When reaching
without vision, we only have proprioception about the
starting position/conﬁguration of the hand. When visual
information about the veridical location of the hand is
provided, the motor response is in general found to be more
accurate than when based on proprioception alone (New-
port et al. 2001; Rossetti et al. 1995; Wann and Ibrahim
1992). This visual information can however be altered by
mirror illusions (Holmes et al. 2004, 2006; Holmes and
Spence 2005), by prism adaptation (Jackson and Newport
2001; Kitazawa et al. 1997; Rossetti et al. 1998), or by
showing a rubber hand (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen 1998). A
common feature of these methodologies is that they all
induce a conﬂict between the proprioceptively perceived
location and the visual location of the participant’s hand (or
rubber hand). However, as mentioned earlier, the effect of
the bodily illusion-induced multisensory conﬂict on sub-
sequent reaching or pointing movements have been
inconsistent.
Holmes and colleagues have shown affected end-point
errors for reaching movements of the unseen (illuded) hand
to a visual target in several well-designed manipulations of
the mirror illusion (e.g., Holmes et al. 2004; Holmes et al.
2006; Holmes and Spence 2005). To date, however, we
have been unable to induce any RHI-dependent effects on
kinematic parameters of reaching movements executed
either toward or with the illuded hand. One large difference
between our RHI(s) and the mirror illusion is the discrep-
ancy between the visual and the proprioceptively perceived
hand location: on average 15 cm in the mirror illusion
paradigms (Holmes et al. 2004; Holmes et al. 2006),
compared to *30 cm in our RHI experiments; in addition
to which the rubber hand was often presented on the body
midline (Kammers et al. 2009a, b, c). Perhaps the magni-
tude of the discrepancy between visual and proprioceptive
information about the hand’s location has limited the
impact of bodily illusions on the motoric body represen-
tation. The perceptual body representation has been found
to represent the body in a fragmented, local way, such that
it might be less dependent on the magnitude of this mul-
timodal discrepancy. In any case, it is striking that the
present RHI experiment reveals effects on a motor
response, now that the magnitude of the induced conﬂict is
reduced to just 2 cm (i.e., difference between the grip
aperture of the rubber hand and the participants own hand).
An alternative explanation might be that the location of
the hand and the posture of the hand are affected differ-
ently in bodily illusions. This hypothesis is supported by
the ﬁnding that incompatibility of posture between the
visual and proprioceptive perceived hand reduced the
effect of the mirror illusion on reaching movements
(Holmes et al. 2006). More speciﬁcally, Holmes et al.
(2006) showed enhanced end-point errors after exposure to
either the reﬂection of a rubber hand or the participant’s
contralateral own hand in a conﬂicting location. They
showed a reduction of the illusion-dependent end-point
biases when the posture of the rubber hand (palm-up) did
not match the unseen (illuded) participant’s own hand
(palm down) (Experiment 2). However, no such reduction
was found when the posture of the participant’s own hand
was manipulated (Experiment 3). Combined, these results
suggest that the effects of exposure to the reﬂection of the
rubber hand are ‘‘an exclusively visual phenomenon, with
no signiﬁcant contribution from postural information
relating to the unseen hand’’ (Holmes et al. 2006, page 12
of 30).
This is in line with the present results for two reasons.
First, there is no conﬂict in starting location between the
rubber hand and the participants own hand in the horizontal
plane, which enables the participant to arrive at the pre-
sented object when reaching without vision. The difference
between the location of the rubber hand and the partici-
pant’s own hand in the vertical plan is not relevant to the
task since the object to grasp is long and in front of the
participant’s own unseen hand as well as the rubber hand.
Second, the results of Holmes et al. (2006) support our
ﬁndings that the starting posture of the participant’s own
Exp Brain Res (2010) 202:203–212 209
123hand is overwritten by the visible posture (i.e., grip aper-
ture) of the rubber hand. It is known that the position of our
hands is based on the weighted sum of visual and propri-
oceptive information (van Beers et al. 1999, 2002). The
present study suggests that visual information about the
postural conﬁguration of a hand (without manipulation its
horizontal location) overrides the proprioceptively per-
ceived conﬁguration to such a degree that subsequent
planned trajectories are affected.
In addition to MGA, we observed an effect of the RHI
on PV. PV during grasping was lower when the starting
grip apertures of the participants own hand and the rubber
hand were in conﬂict than when they were in agreement.
Reductions in PV have previously been shown to be related
to reaching uncertainty (Jeannerod 1986), suggesting that
to some degree the motor system was able to detect the
incongruence between the perceived and veridical grip
apertures. One might speculate that grip aperture incon-
gruence led to reductions in PV because the body schema
might encode limb posture mainly based on visual infor-
mation, but presented with conﬂicting new proprioceptive
update reduces speed of the movement in order to adjust
the grip aperture to the original calibrated (seen) aperture.
Note, however, that such an uncertainty explanation cannot
explain the observed effect of rubber hand grip aperture on
MGA. Uncertainty as a result of grip aperture conﬂict
might be expected to manifest as an interaction effect (an
increase in MGA in incongruent conditions). Instead, we
observe a main effect of rubber hand grip aperture, indi-
cating that participants were not simply opening their hand
wider when they were uncertain. Participants shaped their
hand according to the grip aperture of the rubber hand (as if
it were their own), indicating that the underlying motoric
body representation was affected, rather than that they were
merely less certain in conﬂict conditions.
Finally, there was also a RHI effect on the perceptual
scaling judgments (thought to be subserved by the body
image). Again, participants over- or under-estimated the
starting grip aperture of their own hand according to the
seen grip aperture of the rubber hand. The fact that the RHI
in this experiment affected a perceptual task as well as a
motor task could be taken as contrasting evidence to the
No Illusion Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 1
Grasping
Pointing
x x x x x x x x
Fig. 5 Opposing hypotheses about possible illusion effects on motor
responses in the traditional rubber hand illusion (upper panels) and on
the present grasping task (lower panels). The light gray hand
indicates the participant’s own hand (solid trajectory), and the dark
gray hand indicates the rubber hand (dashed trajectory). Dotted lines
indicate the expected movement trajectory in the absence of an
illusion effect. Arrows indicates the direction of the effect of the
illusion according to each hypothesis. Center panels indicate
unaffected motor responses. Left panels indicate movement trajecto-
ries in which a motor program is planned based on the illuded location
or posture of the hand, and subsequently carried out from the actual
location or posture. Conversely, right panels indicate movement
trajectories in which a trajectory in space is planned, and the motor
system brings the movement of the limb onto this trajectory soon after
the movement begins. Differences are exaggerated for clarity
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123theory of two different underlying body representations,
since the robustness of the body schema and the suscepti-
bility of the body image has been one of the grounds for
their distinctiveness. However, we have already shown that
a motor task can affect subsequent perceptual judgments
(Kammers et al. 2009a), whereas here we ﬁnd no effect of a
preceding perceptual judgment on subsequent motor
responses. This could be interpreted as converging evi-
dence that the two tasks used in the present experiment do
indeed depend on dissociable body representations.
In sum, the present experiment shows that the motoric
bodyrepresentationcanbesensitivetotheRHI,asshownby
two distinct effects on kinematic parameters of a grasping
movement. This was achieved by applying more holistic
stimulation, manipulating postural rather than location
information, and by investigating grasping movements
rather than pointing movements. This ﬁnding suggests that
although perceptual and motor tasks might be subserved by
different body representations, the motoric body represen-
tation is not intrinsically robust to bodily illusion. Further
research on the holistic or global nature of the motoric body
representation, as well as the nature of its susceptibility to
bodily illusions, might shed more light on the precise way in
whichitrepresentsourbody,externalspace(asanobjectora
moving subject), and the interaction between the two.
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